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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Juan Arellano saw his wife in a bar with another man and he shot her, resulting in 
her death. Mr. Arellano pied guilty to first degree murder, admitting that he shot and 
killed his wife, but refusing to state that he acted with premeditation or malice 
aforethought, entering an Alford1 plea to those elements. After Mr. Arellano's unified 
sentence of life, with 22 years fixed, was affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a timely 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief asserting, among other claims, that his trial counsel 
failed to inform him that a homicide committed in the heat of passion is voluntary 
manslaughter, not murder, and that had his attorney informed him of this, he would not 
have pied guilty and would have taken his case to trial. Mr. Arellano 
district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
that the 
Juan Arellano was charged with the first degree murder of his wife, aggravated 
battery, and attempted murder, all of which were alleged to be enhanced by the use of a 
firearm. (R., pp.21-24.) Mr. Arellano reached an agreement with the State wherein he 
would plead guilty to the first degree murder charge and the associated weapons 
enhancement and would be free to argue an appropriate sentence, while the State 
would dismiss the remaining charges and argue for no more than a unified sentence of 
1 See Norlh Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) ("An individual accused of crime may 
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison 
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts 
constituting the crime."). 
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life, with years fixed. (R., pp.28-53.) However, when it came time to actually placing 
his guilty on the record, Mr. Arellano would not state that the shooting was 
premeditated or that he acted with malice aforethought, and the parties agreed that 
Mr. Arellano could enter an Alford plea to those specific elements. (R., pp.83-88.) 
Mr. Arellano was sentenced to a unified term of life, with 22 years fixed, and his 
sentence was affirmed on appeal. (R,. pp.70-73, 89-97, 124-126.) 
Mr. Arellano filed a timely verified Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief, 
generally asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty. 
(R., pp.5-97.) In his petition, Mr. Arellano made the following relevant factual 
assertions: 
29. Petitioner asserts that he lacked the ability to act deliberately and with 
violence against his wife, and the killing of his wife occurred by accident 
because of the blind rage upon seeing her come back into the bar after 
her lover escorted her out. 
30. A jury would have been allowed to infer that the requisite mental state 
was lacking on all the assault charges or he was under the influence of 
two drugs and the culmination of emotions that his wife intentionally 
provoked. 
51. No one knows what Petitioner's intent was when he pulled out a gun 
and walked out onto the dance floor. All petitioner knows is that his 
emotions overwhelmed him, and [he] wanted to rant and rave. 
52. Petitioner asserts her death was an accident and misfortune in the 
heat of his passion as he was attempting to scare her. He never intended 
to kill her, but the rage within was so overwhelming that he was out of 
control and even more by the acts of others. 
53. Under the professional norms, counsel's assistance amounted to 
incompetence. Counsel failed entirely in his representation. 
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54. Petitioner alleges he committed homicide and attempted assaults with 
a weapon in the heat of passion upon the appearance of his wife as she 
intentionally came back to the 
55. Counsel's representation was so seriously defective he was not 
functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
56. Petitioner asserts that there exist(s) a reasonable probability that but 
for counsel's representation, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial. 
57. Counsel's failures prejudice(d) petitioner and if he would have fulfilled 
his obligations he would never have been convicted of any of the charges 
filed by information. 
58. Petitioner advised his attorney (of) his version of the facts surrounding 
the death of his wife. Yet counsel insisted that some of those facts were 
irrelevant, and that if he went to trial he would be found guilty. As a result 
of counsel refusing to participate in petitioner's defense he entered a guilty 
plea. 
(R., pp.10, 13.) The district court granted Mr. Arellano's motion for to the appointment 
of counsel. (R., pp.98-101, 111-112.) 
The State filed an Answer and a motion for summary dismissal, and brief in 
support, generally claiming that Mr. Arellano's claims were bare and conclusory, not 
supported by admissible evidence, or should have been raised on direct appeal, and it 
requested the district court to dismiss the petition. (R., pp.113-116, 120-141.) Counsel 
for Mr. Arellano filed an objection to the State's motion for summary dismissal arguing, 
in part, "Petitioner avers that his counsel advised him that his mental state at the time of 
the alleged incident was not relevant to the case. This is clearly a significant issue that 
needs to be explored to determine the validity of the Defendant's entry of his Guilty 
Plea." (R., p.158 (citation omitted).) 
The district court entered an order granting the State's motion for summary 
disposition. (R., pp.167-184.) Regarding what the court described as Mr. Arellano's 
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claim that trial counsel "advised Mr. Arellano to plead ilty to first degree murder 'when 
the State would not able to prove the '" the found the allegations were 
bare and conclusory and there was sufficient evidence to convict him of murder, and 
that Mr. Arellano failed to prove that his trial counsel's advice to plead guilty was 
deficient "and that he suffered prejudice as a result." (R., pp.170-171.) Mr. Arellano 
timely appealed from the district court's final Judgment dismissing the petition. 
(R., pp.185-186, 200-203.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Arellano's claim that that his trial 
counsel failed to inform him that a homicide committed in the heat of passion is 
voluntary manslaughter, not murder, and that had his attorney informed him of this, he 
would not have pied guilty and would have taken his case to trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Arellano's Claim That That His 
Trial Counsel Failed To Inform Him That A Homicide Committed In The Heat Of Passion 
Is Voluntary Manslaughter, Not Murder, And That Had His Attorney Informed Him Of 
This, He Would Not Have Pied Guilty And Would Have Taken His Case To Trial 
A. Introduction 
In his verified petition, Mr. Arellano made an un-rebutted claim that his trial 
counsel failed to explain to him that a kilting conducted in the heat of passion is not 
murder, and that had his trial counsel informed him of this, he would not have pied guilty 
but would have taken his case to trial. As such, Mr. Arellano's claim raised a genuine 
of material fact which, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to relief. The 
district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim. 
B. Standards Of Review 
A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature and, like a 
plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her allegations upon which the 
requests for relief are based by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008). However, unlike a plaintiff in other civil cases, the original 
post-conviction petition must allege more than merely "a short and plain statement of 
the claim." Id. at 443-444. The application must present or be accompanied by 
admissible evidence supporting the allegations contained therein, or else the post-
conviction petition may be subject to dismissal. Id. In addition, the post-conviction 
petition must set forth with specificity the legal grounds upon which the application is 
based. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). 
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A claim of 
post-conviction nrr,Pu,o 
of counsel may properly brought through 
Thomas v. 1 Idaho 769, 185 P.3d 1, 
(Ct. App. 2008). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner 
must first show that trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
760 (1988). Where a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is 
shown if there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, at 694; Aragon at 
760. Where a petitioner claims that his guilty plea was induced by the erroneous advice 
of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate 
petitioner would not have entered into the 
52, 59-60 (1985). 
but for counsel's erroneous advice, the 
agreement. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition only where the 
petition and evidence supporting the petition fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle him or her to the relief requested. 
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. "A material fact has 'some logical connection with the 
consequential facts[,]' Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is 
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." Id. On 
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary 
hearing, the appellate court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. 




Supreme Court has defined the standard for whether there 
of material fact as whether "the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry 
of determining there is the need for a trial whether, in other words, there are 
any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 
250. If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. 
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner "must be 
regarded as true" for purposes of summary dismissal. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 
250 (2009). Any disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, 
and "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of 
the non-moving party." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009). 
C. There Was A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether Mr. Arellano's Trial 
Counsel Failed To Advise Him That A Killing Done In The Heat Of Passion Is Not 
Murder; Thus, The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing This Claim 
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a person . . . with malice aforethought[.]" 
I.C. § 18-4001. Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a person without 
malice upon a sudden quarrel of in the heat of passion. I.C. § 18-4006(1 ). Mr. Arellano 
provided evidence through his verified petition that he killed his wife in the heat of 
passion and that he informed his trial counsel of this; however, trial counsel told him that 
it was not a defense to murder. (R., pp.10, 13; see also R., p.158).) Furthermore, 
Mr. Arellano swore that had he known that a killing committed in the heat of passion 
was not murder, he would have rejected the plea offer and would have taken his case to 
trial. Id. Mr. Arellano's allegations were not bare and conclusory; rather, they were 
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sworn statements regarding his own with his counsel relevant to his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim The did not present any 
contradicting Mr. Arellano's claim in support of their motion for summary dismissal. As 
such, the district court erred in granting the State's motion for summary dismissal. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Arellano respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
summary dismissal of his claim that his plea was induced by a false promise made by 
his trial counsel, and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 30th day of October, 2014. 
State Appellate Public Defender 
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